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ARE WARS INEVITABLE?

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(PUBLICATION 3730)

CITY OF WASHINGTON
PUBLISHED BY THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION
MAY 11, 1943

The Lord Baltimore Press
BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A.

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INTRODUCTION

War is here defined as the most violent relation that may exist between groups of people. Such a broad generalization is required because modern warfare is only a special form of the institution. As everyone knows, war is only one means of settling differences, and in the discussion that follows I propose to inquire into its origin and its various manifestations, indicate the impossibility of separating a consideration of wars between tribes or nations from disturbances internal to them, review the various motives which ultimate themselves in war, consider the relations which the civil and the military authorities bear to each other in both war and peace, compare warfare in simple and in advanced societies, and point out the intimate connection between motives governing the individual and those which result in collective hostilities. This leads to a consideration of group controls, the differences between intranational relations determined by law and international relations which depend upon negotiations and treaties, a comparison of states resting on conquest and states resting on consent, the effect of warfare upon trade, the place of the military establishment in the national life, and the probable future of the war institution in the light of its origin and its past history. The treatment throughout is from the standpoint of an anthropologist.

VARIOUS WAYS OF SETTLING DIFFERENCES

In past ages it was often believed that wars were decided by fate or the gods. In the former case nothing could be done about it, but gods might be influenced. If the prayers of Maori priests before a war expedition were successful, "it was supposed that the gods of the enemies left them and came to the party by whom they were thus implored, and entering the canoes, clubs, spears, etc., of their army, ensured its victory."¹

To reduce an enemy's fortress, the aid of the gods was invoked and the finest mats, cloth, etc., were taken by the besiegers as near the fortress as they dared go. Here they held the different articles up in their hands and offered them to

¹ References will be found at the end of the paper.

the gods, who, it was supposed, had hitherto favored the besieged, the priests crying, "Tane in the fortress, Oro in the fortress, come to the sea, here are your offerings." The priests of the besieged on the other hand, tried to detain the gods by showing whatever property they possessed, if they thought the gods would be likely to leave them. A warrior would sometimes offer himself and say, "Leave us not, here is your offering, O Oro! even I!" If the property offered by the besiegers to the gods were valuable and abundant, the besieged lost heart, believing that the gods had left them and gone over to the side by whom these offerings had been made. They always thought that the gods were influenced by motives like their own; and when once the besieged received the impression that the gods had forsaken them, their defence became feeble.²

It was probably belief in supernatural intervention that motivated the Chinook, Mohave, and Yuma Indians in arranging formal pitched battles for the settlement of their differences, collective duels as it were.³ In line with this is the following rather surprising Shawnee sentiment recorded by Trowbridge: "If any who were reputed brave met death in battle the Indians acknowledged themselves mistaken and such persons were set down as cowards, because it would have been impossible to kill them had they possessed true courage."⁴

But if victory might be determined in this manner it occurred to some that it was simpler to appeal to the gods in a less laborious and dangerous way. For instance, a champion for each side would be as much under the same influences as an army. The Creeks and Choctaw are said to have settled a dispute regarding certain hunting territories by a ball game, and any gambling game or the mere drawing of lots could be utilized for this purpose. When a grievance arose among the Ona of Tierra del Fuego, Lothrop says that: "(1) there might be war, (2) there might be a wrestling bout, or (3) an individual duel."⁵

Whether supernatural intervention was looked for in all these substitutes for war is not clear, but there were many alternative methods of settling disputes. Among the Mohave Indians of California,

quarrels of various sorts were settled by a sort of combat calculated to prevent fatalities. For instance, when the river flooded the valley, it sometimes changed the configuration of the land or washed away landmarks. A group of people might then assert the boundary of their holdings to have been at a point which their neighbors regarded as well within their own limits. A sort of pushing match, *thupirvek*, was then arranged. One man was surrounded by his friends, who tried to shove or drag him across the disputed territory, whereas their opponents struggled to carry a champion of theirs to the farthest end of the land of the aggressors. In this scuffle legs were sometimes broken and the human foot-balls nearly crushed and pulled to death. The stake of the contest may sometimes have been not only the stretch first in dispute but the entire arable holdings of both contestants.

If the losers were dissatisfied, they reappeared next morning at their asserted boundary, armed with willow poles a couple of inches thick and 5 or 6 feet

long. Each man held a shorter stick in his left hand. The victors met them, and a stick fight, *chetman'a'ak*, ensued, which might last hours. The contestants beat each other over the heads till they were weary. As they parried with their staves, no one was killed, say the Mohave, but men sometimes died afterwards, especially when they fought long on a summer's day and maggots bred in the wounds. The object of each party was to drive the other back across the disputed tract, whereupon title to it was definitely established. The dispossessed losers went to friends elsewhere and might have fields lent to them.⁶

Among the Eskimo there were singing contests, and on the North Pacific Coast the superiority of one family or tribe was established through a property contest, the famous "potlatch." The conqueror was he who gave away or destroyed the greater stock of goods.⁷

Wars resulting from murder were forestalled in many regions by the payment of quantities of property, and this was usual on the North Pacific Coast. The status of the murdered man determined the amount of property given in each case. Following is a most unusual form of compensation quoted by Osgood (from a communication to the Smithsonian Institution in 1864 by W. W. Kirby):

A chief, whose tribe was in disgrace for a murder committed the summer before, met the chief of the tribe to which the victim belonged, and in the presence of all commenced a brilliant oration in favor of him and his people, while he feelingly deplored his own and his people's inferiority. At once, in the most gallant way, the offended chief, in a speech equally warm, refuted the compliments so freely offered, and returned them all, with interest, upon his antagonist. This lasted for an hour or two, when the offender, by a skillful piece of tactics, confessed himself so thoroughly beaten that he should never be able to open his lips again in the presence of his generous conqueror.⁸

Finally, of course, there remain recourse to compromise, and adjudication for the purpose of seeing that absolute justice is done. A compromise is brought about when each party surrenders some of its claims, but it is not necessarily the same thing as justice since, if one of the parties happens to be stronger or possessed of more influence than the other, it is likely to give in less while its opponent is obliged to surrender more points in controversy. An attempt to obtain justice means resort to law where a body of laws exists to which the parties in controversy may appeal, and while the legal and the just are not identical, the former can hardly exist without reference to the latter.

WAR NOT AN ORIGINAL HUMAN INSTITUTION

Ants seem to be the only organisms below man conducting operations resembling warfare. Certain species make mass attacks upon others, plunder them of their pupae or immature young and hold them in a kind of slavery. Among man's nearest relatives, the anthropoid apes, however,

war cannot be said to exist. The only phenomena approaching it are contests between males over females reported particularly from the orang-outan and gorilla. These seem to be practically nonexistent among chimpanzees and gibbons, and while sex is a potent motive for male violence in our own species, it has played a relatively minor role in warfare taken as a whole. Moreover, such contests are in the nature of the case rather duels between individuals than battles between groups. Besides all this, students of anthropoid behavior are emphatic regarding the prevailingly friendly attitude which individual apes maintain toward one another, and this is particularly the case with the chimpanzee, man's closest relative on all other grounds with the possible exception of the gorilla.⁹

A word may here be said regarding the connection sometimes supposed to exist between diet and pugnacity. It has been maintained rather vigorously in certain quarters that meat eating breeds warlike tendencies while a vegetarian diet has the contrary effect. If there were any validity to the argument, mankind as a whole should be pacific since the diet of anthropoids in their native habitats is almost purely vegetarian,¹⁰ but a comparison of vegetarian and carnivorous peoples seems effectually to dispose of it. Thus the aggressive Japanese and pacific Chinese are both rice eaters, while the warlike Plains Indians and pacific Eskimo were mainly carnivorous.

Diet aside, the evidence drawn from our nearest biological relatives refutes the contention that warfare was an original human institution, nor do early remains of man point to a significant development of it in paleolithic times. The war institution certainly existed, however, in the New Stone Age, and from then on it has had a steady if irregular development.

ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR AMONG DIFFERENT PEOPLES

Peoples in all ages have differed very much in their attitude toward war, some being distinctly unwarlike and some markedly aggressive, though the respective traits have by no means remained permanent throughout the lives of the several tribes and nations. Among the central Eskimo war resolved itself mainly into a series of retaliations for murder between families and the occasional lynching of an unusually troublesome individual.¹¹ In the plateau area of the northwest it is asserted that wars were generally infrequent until the introduction of horses. Ray says that all the Shuswap were peaceful except the western bands, that the Sanpoil virtually knew no war, that the same was true of the Southern Okanagon, and that peace generally prevailed with the Colville, the Lake Indians,

and the rest of the Okanagon.¹² The Flathead did not war with other Salish groups, and Turney-High states that Kutenai wars were mainly defensive.¹³ Among Shoshonean tribes "west of the area of bands and the horse," says Steward, "warfare was virtually unknown," and there was evidently little of it anywhere in the area before horses appeared.¹⁴ Kroeber affirms that the Yokuts of California were on the whole peaceful and the Chumash decidedly "unwarlike."¹⁵ The attitude of the Pueblo Indians seems to have been defensive; the Hopi regarded all strife as harmful.¹⁶ The Pima also fought mainly in self-defense, and before European contact the Choctaw seem to have had the same attitude.¹⁷ Landa says of the Maya that they "learned from the Mexicans the use of arms, and they soon became masters of the bow and arrow, the lance and the axe, their shields and jackets made strong with twisted cords and cotton, as well as the other instruments of war, so that finally they neither admired the Mexicans nor feared them."¹⁸ This is evidently exaggerated, yet undoubtedly reflects the relatively peaceful disposition of the Mayan people as opposed to the Nahuatl. The warlike tribes of North America are better known for obvious reasons. Among them may be mentioned the Iroquois (although their league was originally organized as they claim to promote peace), Creeks, Shawnee, Dakota, Cheyenne, Blackfoot, Comanche, Apache, and Aztec.

Roth says that the Achagua, Saliva, and Maku of Guiana were noted for their peaceful proclivities in contradistinction to the Otomac and Carib.¹⁹ Petrullo reports that the Yaruro of Campanaparo River, Venezuela, spoke little of war.²⁰ The Cayapa Indians of Ecuador maintain that in ancient times they rarely went to war and then only on the greatest provocation.²¹ The wars of the Gê tribes of eastern Brazil also seem to have been mainly in self-defense, and blood revenge is said to have been almost the sole motive for such disturbances among the Apinayé. Their peaceableness was praised from early times.²² The Yahgan of Tierra del Fuego exacted blood revenge sometimes when a murder had been committed, but organized warfare was unknown to them.²³ Among the warlike tribes of South America, besides the Otomac and Carib already noted, may be cited the Jivaro and their neighbors, the Tupinamba of eastern Brazil, and the Araucanians of Chile. The Quechua of Peru present the curious phenomenon of a relatively peace-loving people constituting a conquest empire.²⁴

We seem to discern an area of minimal warfare in North America which corresponded to that occupied by loosely organized tribes or bands. It included the eastern and central Eskimo, the northeastern Athapaskan tribes, and the tribes of the Plateau and Great Basin, extending into Cali-

fornia and embracing many of the tribes of the Southwest. In South America similar areas are indicated among the Gê tribes of Brazil and the more primitive peoples of Guiana and Bolivia and in the extreme south of the continent.

Turning to the Old World, we may note first Skeat and Blagden's characterization of the Sakai of the Malay Peninsula as "a most peaceful race," who, "now at all events [their work was printed in 1906] never make war on each other or go in for any sort of intertribal fighting," although it is added that the wild Sakai never lost an opportunity to get revenge upon the Malay for their cruelty. The Benua and Jakun tribes of the same region were inoffensive and unwarlike.²⁵ The philosophy of the later Hindus and of the Chinese induced an unwarlike disposition among these two great peoples which seemed frequently to operate to their disadvantage but has not prevented them from becoming the most populous peoples on the earth nor their culture from continuing intact and dominant in the respective regions occupied by them. Lapps have always been noted for their inoffensive character, and the tribes of circumpolar Asia are generally unwarlike. The fighting peoples of Asia occupied for the most part an intermediate belt extending from Japan through Manchuria, Mongolia, and the Himalayas, and anciently covering most of western Asia. To these must be added, of course, the Malay in the extreme southeast.

The following quotation concerning the peoples in Iran from an article by Jacques de Morgan written in 1912 shows, however, that not all peoples esteemed warlike are necessarily such:

War for them consists in pillage; they assassinate, but they do not come to blows. The Turks themselves, who in other countries under powerful chiefs show such great military qualities, are wretched soldiers under the Persian system.

In my many journeys I am often placed in perilous situations. On nearly every journey I have been deserted by all my native personnel or else forced to go on with much reduced force rather than to be left alone. My men would tell me "I fear," and I could not understand this cowardice on the part of men armed and strong enough for defense. But in studying them and talking with them I finally comprehended their attitude. Fear among these people, who had never been taught courage, is a nervous sensation comparable to vertigo. Fear is not dishonorable in them any more than vertigo is in us, and none of them ever having been taught to banish fear by the will, nor made to understand that on courage depends the life and prosperity of the individual and the community, they give way to fear and frankly confess it.²⁶

The warlike tribes of Africa lay to the east and north. The Egyptians, however, were not naturally warlike and exhibited no marked warlike tendencies except for a few centuries after the Hyksos invasion, but they soon committed most of their military operations to mercenaries. The Hot-

tentots, Baganda, and Monbuttu may be classified among the less warlike peoples of Africa in contradistinction to the Masai and Zulu. Linton describes the Tanala as one of the least militant of the Madagascar tribes, "a mélange of defeated gentes, numerically weak and politically divided, they were content to remain in their own territory, only asking to be left alone." ²⁷ The natives of most of the Canary Islands were taught to fight from their earliest infancy, but it is said that those in the island of Hierro "knew not war and had no weapons unless their long leaping-poles were used as such when occasion demanded." ²⁸

REVENGE THE LEADING WAR MOTIVE AMONG PRIMITIVE PEOPLES

The most widely spread cause of, or excuse for, war among primitive peoples is revenge for a real or imagined injury. The sentiment in the minds of those who seek revenge is, however, better expressed by another term which we constantly hear, "getting even." The assumption in the mind of the speaker is that he, his family, or his clan, has suffered at least one injury more than has been inflicted upon it, or indeed that the speaker or his group has experienced an injustice without giving any provocation. He can tell you a story to prove this, and the other party may use almost the same language and tell a story which is equally plausible. If one attempts to trace these stories to their origins, he will usually find that he is upon a chain of injury and counterinjury extending so far back into the past that the actual beginnings have been forgotten. Nevertheless, the mutual animosity exists and the feud goes on and on. So deeply seated in the mores of primitive people—and of people not so primitive—has this attitude become that refusal to accept it as a principle of action would be regarded not merely as cowardly and as a betrayal of the family faith, but as immoral and impious. This is particularly true when the happiness of the dead is believed to depend on exacting of vengeance. And undoubtedly people accustomed to the institution would at once inquire how the innocent were to be protected if those bent on murder were relieved of any fear of reprisal. Abolishment of it required a revolution in human thinking, although it was deprecated by most of the great philosophers including Confucius, Plato, Cicero, and Seneca. In the Old Testament personal vengeance is opposed as interfering with a divine prerogative, and the Sermon on the Mount flatly condemned it. The solution was found in part through the action of individuals strong-minded enough to refuse resort to it, thereby breaking the chain of reprisal and counterreprisal, and in part by the constitution of impartial bodies to adjust such cases and provided with powers of enforcement.

With revenge cannibalism was sometimes associated. Flesh of slain enemies was eaten by New Zealanders "from motives of revenge and hatred, to cast disgrace on the persons eaten, and to strike terror," not to acquire strength and courage. In Fiji "the eating of a man was regarded as the very acme of revenge,"²⁹ and we shall see presently to what horrible extremes these people were led by this motive coupled with the religious sign and seal.

CONTESTS NOT NECESSARILY BETWEEN UNRELATED PEOPLE

From the above discussion it is clear that the institution of blood vengeance existed both inside of groups and between groups. That means that violence within the tribe in primitive society, or civil wars if you please, cannot be differentiated from wars between group and group. There was no sharp distinction between intertribal and intratribal wars of this type. When wars began in any other manner, revenge usually entered quickly as a secondary motive. Not only did contests frequently break out inside of tribal units, but it often happened that tribal units did not fight each other as units. Kroeber says that the Yuki of California rarely if ever fought as a united body. Costanoan wars were village feuds, and the war alignment was not based on relationship.³⁰ On the North Pacific Coast the towns of distinct stocks—Haida, Tlingit, Tsimshian, Wakashan, and Salishan—fought without compunction people closely related to themselves as well as those not at all related. The head-hunting expeditions of the Jivaro were mainly within the tribe. In the Creek-American War of 1813-1814 the Lower Creeks and part of the Upper Creeks refused to join the hostiles, and the Lower Creeks took up arms against their fellow tribesmen. The American Revolution occasioned a split in the Iroquois Confederation and suspension for a time of the confederate government.

Closely related tribes were frequently at odds, as the Choctaw and Chickasaw, Dakota and Assiniboin, Iroquois and Huron. Kroeber describes the following line-up of tribes in southern California, southern Nevada, and western Arizona:

On one side were the Chemehuevi, Southern Paiute, Mohave, Yuma, Kamia, Yavapai, and Apache. These were generally friendly to the less enterprising and passive northern Serrano of the desert, and, so far as they knew them, to the Yokuts, the Tübatulabal, the Chumash and perhaps the Gabrielino. On the other side were the Hopi; the Pima and most of the Papago; of Yuman tribes, the Havasupai, Walapai, Maricopa, Halchidhoma, Kohuana, Halyikwamai, Cocopa, Diegueño, and the Cuñeil or northernmost Baja Californians; of southern California Shoshoneans, the Serrano proper, the Cahuilla, and possibly the Luiseño.³¹

That is, Shoshonean, Yuman, Athapascan, and perhaps Penutian Indians were lined up on one side and Shoshonean Pueblos, Shoshoneans of southern California, Pimans and Yumans on the other, the Serrano apparently being split in two.

In the Old World we note that the greater states of Mesopotamia and Egypt were built up in part through wars among towns of the same people. There were constant struggles between the Greek cantons, among the kingdoms of the Anglo-Saxon "Heptarchy," the Christian states of Spain, Italy, Germany, and Russia, while much of the history of China and India is made up of conflicts between principalities populated by the same, or very nearly related, peoples. Relations between the Russians and Poles, the Poles and Ukrainians, and the Serbs and Bulgarians have not necessarily been cordial because both parties spoke Slavic languages.

MOTIVES FOR WAR OTHER THAN REVENGE

SOCIAL ADVANCEMENT

Beside retaliation which, as noted, seems to have been the most widely spread war motive, we find the pursuit of honor and social advancement constantly appearing. Unlike other tribes of California the Mohave and Yuma were incited by hopes of warlike renown. This and advancement in the social scale which closely accompanied it was an ever-present element throughout all the eastern part of North America and on the Plains. The situation was similar in a large area in the northern part of South America. Speaking of the Jivaro, Stirling says:

At the present time the Jivaros are without doubt the most warlike group in all South America, and it is probable that this statement would hold true for the past century. In this respect, however, they have merely retained a custom and a war pattern that was widespread in northwestern South America at the time of the conquest. . . . The accounts given of the methods of warfare practiced by neighboring tribes and by distant tribes of the highlands of Ecuador and Peru would seem to indicate that their motivation and method of fighting were very similar. Raids on different groups in order to obtain trophy heads, individual prestige enhanced by this same method; even the preparation of tsantsas [shrunk human heads] and the accompanying feats and ceremonies were carried on over a large region.³²

The same motive appears in the Orinoco, and Rochefort says of the West Indian Caribs that

the end they proposed to themselves in their expeditions was not to become masters of a new country, or to load themselves with the spoils of their enemies, but only the glory of subduing and triumphing over them, and the pleasure of satiating their revenge for the injuries they had received.³³

In Mangaia in the Cook Islands, Polynesia, "political authority came to be one of the spoils of war," each victorious leader becoming chief in turn.³⁴ A Kutchin warred partly for the purpose of acquiring prestige and the possibility of becoming a chief.³⁵ Among some Nigerian tribes the social status of a man was determined by the number of heads he had cut off,³⁶ and throughout the East Indies the taking of heads and social advancement went hand in hand. In East Africa possession of cattle determined status, and social ambition lay behind the chronic cattle-lifting raids. This was also responsible to some extent for slave-hunting expeditions on the North Pacific Coast of America, though there it was more difficult to override the power of the established families.

On the question being put to the Nagas whether they would like to become the subjects of the [East India] Company, they promptly replied, "No, we could not then cut off the heads of men and attain renown as warriors, bearing the honorable marks of our valor on our bodies and faces."³⁷

But even in primitive societies warfare was not everywhere a primary means of social advancement. Success in hunting, in fishing, in oratory, in games, in dealings with the supernatural played varying parts among various tribes. In Malekula in the New Hebrides a man did not rise in the social scale through war but through the performance of certain ceremonies. In some of the other islands of this group caste was attained by sacrificing pigs.³⁸ In many other places, but conspicuously on the Northwest Coast, what counted was the possession of property. "Money talked."

EXCITEMENT

The excitement of war appealed especially to young men and caused them to view it as a sport. That is given as one reason for war expeditions undertaken by the Menominee Indians.³⁹ It was regarded as a "sport" by the Maricopa and the Yuman Indians of the lower Colorado, by the Tanaina of Cook Inlet, Alaska, the Thompson Indians of British Columbia and the Klallam of Puget Sound,⁴⁰ and indeed the sentiment was very widely entertained.

RELIGIOUS OBLIGATION

War was often given a profound religious sanction. The Murngin of Australia fought "to punish sacrilege."⁴¹ Expeditions were widely undertaken to revenge the death of someone alleged to have been destroyed by witchcraft, and in response to dreams. Peoples as far apart as the ancient Greeks, the Singphos of Assam, and our Chickasaw

Indians held that the manes of the dead would obsess and torment the living until quieted by the destruction of enemies.⁴² Philippine tribes went to war to obtain human beings whom they might offer up in sacrifice,⁴³ and the Naga of Assam had the custom of "cutting off the heads, hands, and feet of anyone they meet with, without any provocation or preexisting enmity, merely to stick them up in their fields, and so ensure a good crop of grain." This practice was said to be very common among the Lotah Nagas.⁴⁴ But the classic example of this kind of warfare is furnished by the Aztec who sacrificed captives taken in war by thousands.

A striking instance of the religious sanction as applied to head hunting is furnished by the Wa tribe on the Salween River, Indo-China. These people

hunt for human heads which they regard as a protection against evil spirits. They think that without a human skull the crops would fail, the kine might die, the father and mother spirits would be shamed and might be enraged; if there were no protecting skull the other spirits who are all malignant might gain entrance and kill the inhabitants, or drink all the liquor.

No doubt a wild Wa never misses a chance of taking a head when an opportunity presents itself. The skulls are looked upon as a safeguard against and a propitiation of the evil spirits. The ghost of the dead man hangs about his skull and resents the approach of other spirits, not from any goodwill for the villages, for all spirits are mischievous and truculent, but because he resents trespassing on his coverts. For this reason the skulls of strangers are always the most valuable, for the ghost does not know his way about the country and cannot possibly wander away from his earthly remains. He also all the more resents the intrusion of vagrant ghosts on his policies. They cramp his movements, and a ghost wants plenty of elbow room. An unprotected stranger is therefore pretty sure to lose his head if he wanders among the wild Was, no matter what the time of the year may be. The more eminent he is the better, for the Wa are quite of the opinion of the tribes farther north, that an eminent man will make a puissant, brabbling ghost, who will dominate the country-side, and secure his owners sleep of nights.⁴⁵

The regular head-hunting season, however, opens in March and lasts through April; a new skull is always needed for the crops of the new year.⁴⁶

The following paragraphs give in a broader picture the way in which this institution was bound up with the entire economic, social, and religious life of an Indonesian tribe:

Of all the savages in the island [of Formosa] the Atayals are the most active and aggressive in head-hunting. This ferocious practice has entered into their life, and plays so prominent a part in their whole social system as to have become almost ineradicable so long as a remnant of their old life remains. The Atayals consider head-hunting justifiable, in fact obligatory, in the following cases:

1. To be assured of a year of abundance, the heads of freshly killed human beings must be offered up to their ancestors.

2. To qualify for entrance into the councils as a recognized adult.
3. To gain favor with the unmarried female, making it possible to obtain as wife one of the most attractive damsels.
4. To obtain rank and influence. The degree of respect and admiration gained among fellow-savages is dependent upon the number of heads secured.
5. To gain for the individual and his family, and even for the tribe, freedom from pestilence. For instance, smallpox is sometimes prevalent; to drive out the pest the nearest relatives of the patient will engage in a head-hunting expedition.
6. To be considered victor in a dispute or to recover one's standing after having committed some offence against one's fellows. Thus, when two savages quarrel and cannot arrive at a settlement, both parties disappear; and the first to return with a head obtains a settlement of the dispute in his favor. Also one who is suspected of having offended against the established rules of Atayals may clear himself of reproach by bringing to his village a newly decapitated head.

Taking the above into consideration, it would appear that head-hunting enters into the religion of the Atayals. Furthermore, according to the moral standard of the people, it is positively obligatory on every male adult, unless such individual is prepared to incur the hatred and probably the hostility of his comrades.⁴⁷

The end result of such an alliance between war and its accompaniments and religion may be shown best by the following quotations bearing on the blood-lust of the ancient Fijians:

The extent to which the thirst for blood prevails [in Fiji], as the best means of deprecating the wrath of malignant deities whom they worship, would be incredible, but for the undeniable testimony of many reliable witnesses. Canoes launched over the living bodies of slaves as rollers, houses built on similar foundations, the immediate massacre of all unfortunates in whom were detected the fatal sign of shipwreck, "salt-water in the eyes," are, or until lately were [this account was written in 1853], practices sanctioned by religion, the omission of which, at the proper season for their performance, was sure to call down the indignation of the gods, and the punishment of the too-merciful offenders. The suppression of all natural affection must be supposed to have been completed when the burying alive of parents who had become burdensome to their children, and even of sickly sons by the hands of their own fathers, were events of almost daily occurrence. The principal directors and instigators of these monstrous rites are the priests, whose office is in general, though not always, hereditary.⁴⁸

In contemplating the character of this extraordinary portion of mankind, the mind is struck with wonder and awe at the mixture of a complicated and carefully conducted political system, highly-finished manners, and ceremonious politeness, with a ferocity and practice of savage vices which is probably unparalleled in any other part of the world.⁴⁹

The astonishing vagaries of the human reason when applied to religious practices may be further illustrated by the following reference:

Though all Afghans are fanatically zealous in the pursuit of their religion, yet some are so ignorant of its teachings that more civilized Muhammadans are hardly willing to admit their right to a place in the congregation of the faithful. The Wazirs, for instance, who would always be ready to take their share in a religious

war, are not only ignorant of all but the elementary truths of Muhammadanism, but the worship of saints and graves is the chief form their religion takes. The Afridis are not far removed from them in this respect, and it is related of a certain section of the Afridis that, having been taunted by another tribe for not possessing a shrine of any holy man, they enticed a certain renowned Seyyed to visit their country, and at once despatched and buried him, and boast to this day of their assiduity in worshipping at his sepulchre.⁵⁰

CAPTURE OF WOMEN

Inasmuch as war probably began before there were large accumulations of property, it may be surmised that expeditions having plunder as their main object came rather late in the history of the institution. If there was any exception, it was in the case of women and slaves, but a hunting or gathering economy has little use for slaves. Women were plundered from foreign tribes by the Australians.⁵¹ They constituted one of the principal motives for making war between the Eskimo and the interior Indians of Alaska. James mentions "the elopement of squaws" as a principal occasion for war on the northern Plains. The Mohave warred to obtain female slaves, and the Orinoco Indians to obtain both women and boys.⁵² The outstanding case of woman-lifting is provided, however, by the Arapesh of northwestern New Guinea of whom Fortune says:

A social organization of woman stealing from foreign localities prevailed amongst them, and was their traditional provocation for warfare, as head-hunting, cannibal raiding, pig stealing, and revenge expeditions for sorcery are traditional provocation amongst other tribes of the area.

The continual piracy of women, with women's consent, across sovereign frontiers was not left to the casual play of private sexual passions. It was a highly organized social pattern undertaken by sovereign communities against one another, and partly motivated by their collective rivalries and even hatreds.⁵³

SLAVERY

The above is essentially one manifestation of the primitive, but by no means universal, custom of marriage by capture to which the Australian and Alaskan instances also seem to belong. The Mohave and the Orinoco tribes, however, appear to have been in quest of slaves. Slavery generally came about as a byproduct of war. It was developed little in hunting, food gathering, and the lower horticultural economies, in which captives were generally dispatched or adopted. Adoption was widely employed in eastern North America, and it is surprising to find how many captives accommodated themselves to changed conditions so completely that they took part in war expeditions against their former friends

and carried off scalps from them without the slightest compunction. Some Canadian tribes are said to have gone to war in order to repeople towns that had been decimated in an epidemic.⁵⁴ A few adult males were retained as slaves by our southeastern Indians who cut off portions of their feet in order to prevent them from escaping, but there seem to have been very few such captives. On the North Pacific Coast, however, slavery was an important element in the social framework, though it served rather to glorify the chiefs and nobility than to fill an important economic function. Slavery in the Oriental and Mediterranean worlds was so deeply rooted in the economic fabric that Plato was unable to think of an ideal state functioning without it. It became of some significance in China in the period of the Han dynasty but afterward declined and disappeared, unable to compete with free and conscript labor.⁵⁵ In the classic land of slavery, Africa, the institution has existed from a remote period, the slaves being in part captives taken in war and in part those who had been pawned for debt. Upon the average their lot was not particularly hard. In later years Arabs have been the principal slave traders, but Hambly says:

According to B. Meakin, who studied the subject of slavery in Morocco, the treatment given by Arabs to their slaves when the desert journey was ended was far more humane than that accorded to Negroes who were transported to the New World by Europeans and Americans. In Morocco, Negro blood was not a social disadvantage, and slaves, together with their progeny, were to some extent protected by Koranic law. Exceptional instances of cruelty occurred, and slaves were openly sold in the markets, but a wealthy master would scorn to have his slaves ill fed, miserably clothed, or badly housed. . . . Meakin states that according to Koranic law masters could mate their slaves, but they were not allowed to separate husbands, wives, and their children. Children of masters by their slaves were free persons, and the mothers of such children could not be sold, but gained their freedom on the death of their master.⁵⁶

In comparing slavery under a native African tribe and under the whites the same writer remarks: "The conditions of slavery among the Wahehe of East Africa again show that the indigenous African slavery was of a more humane type than that practiced by European traders,"⁵⁷ and what this latter was like appears on an earlier page where W. Bosman, chief factor for the Dutch at Elmina, is quoted as saying:

They are all brought out together, where by our surgeons whose province it is, they are thoroughly examined even to the smallest member, and that naked too, both men and women, without the least distinction or modesty. The invalids and the maimed being thrown out as I have told you, the remainder are numbered and it is entered who delivered them. In the meanwhile a burning iron with the arms or names of the companies lies in the fire, with which ours are marked on the breast. This is done that we may distinguish them from the slaves

of the English, French, or others, which are also marked with their mark. I doubt not but this trade seems very barbarous to you, but since it is followed by necessity [!] it must go on, but we yet take all possible care that they are not burned too hard, especially the women, who are more tender than the men.⁵⁸

PLUNDER

Speaking of the Indian tribes west of the Orinoco, Depons is authority for the statement that "from the poverty of the different tribes, the love of plunder never animated them to the attack. Their object in going to war was to devastate rather than conquer; to destroy rather than possess."⁵⁹ But such abstinence was exceptional. Mention has been made of the capture of slaves to enhance the social position of the captors. Cattle were driven off for similar reasons by the tribes of East Africa and horses by our Plains Indians. As we approach the North Pacific Coast of America the property motive in making war becomes stronger and stronger, though here it is also tied up with social aspiration. Although wars between the monarchies of western Asia, noticeably those participated in by Babylonia and Assyria, were undertaken to redress assumed injuries or under a religious sanction, they resolved themselves largely into plundering expeditions, as did the conquests of Alexander and the wars of Rome. Even when plunder was not the primary purpose of armed expeditions, the fact that mercenaries came to constitute such a large part of the armies insured the presence of that motive in an ever increasing degree, first under the Romans, and later in the Middle Ages.

APPROPRIATION OF TERRITORY

Conquest of territory is mentioned as a motive far less than one would have supposed. This seems to have been because in early times land was plentiful for the uses to which it was being put. A great deal of displacement of population was due to causes which might be defined as accidental—climatic changes, pressure of other tribes, etc.—and frequently the tribes displaced found territories equally good. On the other hand, after intensive agriculture came into existence, conquering peoples generally preferred to allow those engaged in back-breaking toil upon the land to continue while they extorted their own living from them. In such cases the displacements were rather of the upper classes than of the masses of the people.

Local struggles involving the control of hunting or fishing stations or advantageous food-gathering areas did indeed take place in very primitive societies. A dispute over hunting and fishing rights occasioned one war among the Pomo Indians of California.⁶⁰ A Chaco tribe "will dam

a stream and prevent fish from ascending to the territory of its neighbors. The latter attempt to destroy the dam, possibly killing a fisherman, and then a feud is on."⁶¹

In the Hawaiian Islands and Mangareva lands were taken over by the conquerors, but the humbler tenants were not necessarily dispossessed. Change in the ownership of land as a result of war is reported from other parts of Polynesia, but some of the island population regarded the original ownership as a mystical relation which they dared not infringe upon.⁶² Concern about land seems to have been particularly keen on islands, for we read that wars were waged over tribal boundaries in the Canary Islands.⁶³ Intrusion upon clan lands was one occasion for war upon the Northwest Coast of America.

TRADE

Control of trade routes would seem to concern mainly people at a high stage of civilization, but since the status of the principal tribes and leading chiefs upon the North Pacific Coast depended largely upon control of passes through the mountains, Fort Selkirk, a Hudson Bay Co. post at the junction of Pelley and Lewes Rivers, Yukon Territory, was destroyed by the Chilkat Indians because it threatened their monopoly, and the Hudson Bay Co. found it expedient to purchase the right to trade up some of the rivers flowing through the mountains into the Pacific.⁶⁴ The Occaneechi tribe of southern Virginia was so jealous of English traders bound for territories beyond that it put every obstacle in their way,⁶⁵ and similar attitudes were encountered in other parts of North America. The Ovimbundu of East Africa went to war, not merely for cattle and slaves, but in reprisal for interference with the caravan trade.⁶⁶

DEFENSE

Opposed to all the motives so far enumerated is defense, the desire of a tribe or nation to remain at peace, and merely to preserve the status quo. This may arise from a simple, peace-loving disposition or be due to a state of prosperity which the people in question do not wish to have disturbed.

FEAR

Closely connected with this last is fear. A nation not desiring to fight may be induced to increase its armaments progressively because of the real or imagined aggressiveness of a neighbor. At times two nations

equally desirous of peace will frighten each other into such increases until some incident precipitates them into actual warfare. It is a curious quirk of the human mind that its fears sometimes produce exactly what it fears.

RELATIONS OF THE CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES TO EACH OTHER

Among the peoples of the world as a whole the civil government is considered normal, government by war leaders in times of crisis exceptional. Thus the civil chiefs occupied permanent positions in the tribe or nation, determined by heredity or election, and might or might not be competent, while the war leaders reached their positions through personal ability, exercised their authority for limited periods only, and, if they occupied official positions, these were not ordinarily determined by descent or confined to specific clans as was frequently the case with civil chieftainships. At the same time it must be remembered that military command demanded a knowledge of but one kind of technique, while headship of the state in time of peace to be eminently successful required some knowledge of a multitude of techniques along with mastery of the controlling principles and prejudices of the masses.

The civil chiefs of the Iroquois were definite in number and elected by certain family strains or *ohwachira*, while the war chiefs and "pine tree chiefs" were self-made men. In Creek towns the civil chiefs were usually elected from specific clans, but the head warrior's position depended upon merit alone and he might belong to any clan. In nearly all Pueblo towns civil chiefs took precedence of war leaders. In the Roman Republic authority was exercised in time of peace by two elected consuls, but when a serious war was to be undertaken they were superseded by a dictator chosen for the occasion for his proven ability. Where expeditions were continually being sent out for war honors or horses as in the case of our Plains Indians and woodland tribes, the functions of the civil chiefs continued uninterruptedly, the authority of war leaders merely extending to the party which they led and for the period of the expedition. It was only during warfare on a large scale that the authority of the war leaders tended to supplant that of the civil chiefs. The different status of war and peace leaders was evidently due to the fact that under ordinary conditions the life of a tribe might continue for long periods successfully under a relatively weak leader who might hold his position by descent, but in actual warfare the weak were quickly eliminated regardless of family.

From time to time certain states developed a special war complex, and in such cases the chief or monarch usually had military talent or was soon replaced by a man who had. The great military states of central Asia and East Africa were built up by individuals—Attila, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, Chaka, Sebituane, Mosilikatsi—and did not long outlast those who brought them into existence. Certain others, however, early acquired a war complex which was passed on from generation to generation until the empires to which they gave rise collapsed from internal weaknesses or through contact with a still more powerful state or confederation of states. The African Masai and Zulu

were aggressive and predatory at all times, and the military organizations determined the nature of the social and economic structures. [But] the military organization of the Jagas, a Negro tribe of Angola which was described by Andrew Battell in the year 1600, provides an instance of a military organization which was entirely predatory and itinerant, and without the civic background of a state and a definite portion of territory. Under such a system, no agricultural or pastoral pursuits were possible, and even the palm trees were cut down to provide sap for making wine. (Sedentary dwellers drew the sap at intervals without injuring the trees.) Every economic principle was sacrificed to the necessity of quick movement and surprise attacks. The Jagas destroyed their children, since these were an encumbrance, but to replace this loss by infanticide they adopted captive children who were old enough to fend for themselves.⁶⁷

We are here reminded of the Janissaries and Mamelukes.

These, however, are merely examples of the few outstanding exceptions to the primacy of the civil agencies in the conduct of state affairs.

WARFARE IN SIMPLE AND IN ADVANCED SOCIETIES

While war is not an "original" institution and there have always been unwarlike peoples, great areas of the earth's surface were occupied in early times and also within the historic period by tribes in a state of chronic warfare. These wars, however, were quite different from those with which we are familiar among modern nations. For the most part they consisted in petty raids for the purpose of advancing the social fortunes and satisfying the thirst for excitement of the participants and, ostensibly at least, to avenge injuries previously inflicted by the enemy. This last was usually regarded both as a social and a religious duty and some sort of religious sanction was normally present. Supported as they were by such fundamental feelings as love of adventure, personal ambition, and the supernatural thrill, it is not strange that the war institution among such peoples was difficult to eradicate and usually required a revolution like that produced by the irruption of western civilization. Plundering of women probably introduced the property motive; slave

hunting, cattle lifting, and horse stealing belong to a later stage; while wars for the aggrandizement of a nation or its leaders and so-called economic wars, which are in reality large-scale plundering expeditions, are comparatively modern.

CONNECTION BETWEEN WAR MOTIVES AND PERSONAL MOTIVES

Revenge, a primary motive in wars among primitive people, seems to play less of a part nowadays, but it is still represented in the form of national or racial antipathy. There may be little natural antagonism between individuals of two nations at enmity or involved in war, but the evil deeds of the enemy, real or supposed, are dramatized and redramatized from year to year until each regards the other as wholly evil. A moral issue is then believed to exist in which one's own nation stands for virtue and the opposing one for wickedness. There may, of course, be a genuine moral issue, but its existence must be established on grounds other than inherited prejudice.

The sex motive is often responsible for murder and other crimes against the person, but these in the nature of the case are apt to be individual rather than collective. One is rarely jealous of a collection of rivals to the extent of injuring them all. The slaughter of the suitors by Ulysses was not due to jealousy, since the slayer was assured of the affections of his wife by the best of evidences. At times a family, clan, or nation may go to war on account of a sex crime committed by some other group, as was traditionally the case with the Trojan War. An offense of this sort is said to have split apart the Oto and Missouri Indians, and where marriage by capture has been common, small-scale feuds and wars were started or at least aggravated in this way, but such incidents played little part in wars of major proportions. At least they rarely acted as sole causes in such wars.

An attack by one person upon another in order to obtain his property need not necessarily involve murder, though murder was frequently incidental to robbery. The same end could be attained by binding the victim and going through his pockets, by taking property from him when his mind is otherwise engaged as does the pickpocket, by swindling operations, extortion, false accusation, blackmail, manipulation of the legal processes, or even by enacting laws to that end if the enemy is sufficiently powerful. Appropriation of the property of a tribe or nation was a main war motive in advanced societies and was apt to be a result of war even if not its original cause.

In modern times wars have been waged less directly for plunder but for the possession of trade routes and trading privileges, or to oust suc-

cessful, or dangerous, rivals from the enjoyment or possible enjoyment of such privileges. While this motive may seem farther removed from dealings between individuals than in the other cases, we have to be reminded that the history of business is full of instances of economic wars between individuals and corporations in which control of materials or trade outlets, price cutting, manipulation of legal machinery, and protracted litigation have been employed, and if such practices are less evident today between individuals it is merely because business has been absorbed to a greater extent by corporations and trusts, and laws have become more stringent.

AREAS OF LAW

In short, the motives behind all wars are identical in kind with those contests exhibited, or latent, between man and man in any nation. The one point of difference is that ordinarily individuals operate within an area of established law which, although subject to corruption and perversion, serves to settle the great majority of differences without resort to violence, and when violence is employed it appears as a violation of law, is called a crime, and exposes the offender to punishment. Differences between groups within a nation are similarly open to legal adjudication, even including large sections of the population such as are included in the forty-eight States of our Union. Between independent nations no law exists as yet which is recognized as binding upon both parties to a dispute. There is a body of precedent which has come to receive the designation "international law," but it is not yet administered under universally recognized international courts nor is there an international police to enforce its decisions. Nations may agree to settle their differences in accordance with it or by some form of arbitration or compromise, but it is not necessary for them to do so. They may also resort to arms, and such resort has not yet been placed in the category of crimes by the sentiment of mankind or a superior governing body sufficiently powerful to insure obedience. "Aside from recent qualified experiments prohibiting war," says Professor Borchard, "international law permits war, regarding it as something like a disease but expressing no moral judgment on the merits of the issue."⁶⁸ The only difference in relations between individuals and groups of individuals within a nation on one side and the relations between nations is that the area of law with its accompaniment of courts and police has not yet been extended to the latter.

The evolution of human society shows a progressive modification of individual rights for the very purpose of safeguarding individual rights. The duty of punishment for murder has been removed successively from

the nearest relative of the victim and his family, to his clan or town, his tribe, and to the nation. The same transfer has taken place in cases of sex offenses and in offenses against property. At the same time the areas of groups over which law has extended have been progressively increased. Governments originally confined to families have extended to bands, clans, and tribes, and from tribes to associations of tribes in nations, while the areas of nations themselves have in the main expanded.

AREAS OF LAW ESTABLISHED BY CONQUEST AND BY CONSENT

In this connection, however, a careful distinction must be made between nations (areas of law) which have grown up by the consent of the masses of their people and unions enforced by wars of conquest. The former have usually proved stable, while the latter have normally fallen to pieces within a few centuries at the outside.

The most striking conquest empires were those of Alexander the Great, the Romans, the Islamic Arabs, Attila, Genghis Khan, Tamerlane, the Osmanli Turks, the Aztec, the Quechua, the Spaniards, and those of the Zulu leaders, Chaka, Dingaan, Sebituane, and Mosilikatsi. The Zulu states scarcely outlasted the lives of their founders, and the same was true of the empire built up by Attila. The states brought into existence by Genghis Khan and Tamerlane also began to disintegrate on the deaths of those who originated them. Genghis Khan's domain reached imperial proportions about A. D. 1200, the Mongol dynasty in China was destroyed in 1368, and the Mongol state founded in Russia, the Golden Horde, split into still smaller parts and was brought to an end by the Russians in 1462. Tamerlane's career of conquest began about 1369, and the rule of his descendants over Samarkand came to an end in 1499 long after they had lost the greater part of his empire.

Alexander's empire came into existence with his victory at the battle of Arbela in 331 B. C. and practically died with him 8 years later.

The Arabian Empire grew rapidly for about a hundred years, until the defeat of the Moslems at Tours A. D. 732 and their failure to take Constantinople at about the same time, but 23 years later Spain was lost to the central government, in 800 North Africa fell away, Egypt practically regained its independence in 868, and Persia in 900. The remnant of the empire continued a feeble existence until 1258 when Baghdad, the capital, was captured by the Mongols. All the important provinces resumed an independent national life in less than 300 years after Mohammed's death.

When Europeans discovered the Western Continent they found there two native empires contrasting remarkably with each other in many ways.

That of the Aztec, which sprang out of an alliance between three tribes in the Valley of Mexico, was on a strictly military basis and was a product of about 150 years of warfare. Some parts of the empire had but recently been conquered, it was held together entirely by force, and few of the subject peoples gave any help when destruction threatened. The Incaic empire is supposed to have had behind it about 400 years of growth. Although it was subjecting more and more tribes during this period, if we may trust our authorities it conformed much more nearly to the ideal of "a government for the sake of the governed" than ancient Mexico. And yet it is surprising how quickly 400 Spanish freebooters put an end to it, although the Incas had tens of thousands of men at their disposal. When we recall that a few years later the small Chickasaw tribe with not more than 1,500 fighting men nearly destroyed the army of Pizarro's most brilliant lieutenant, Hernando de Soto, 600 strong, we begin to realize that it is not the number who fight but the spirit with which they fight that is most significant. Pizarro's easy conquest of Peru would seem to prove that a beneficent government maintained by force, independently of the will of the governed, is no more stable than a conquest empire of harsher type. There were formidable rebellions among the Peruvian Indians at a later date, but the insurgents appear not to have represented the empire as a whole.

In many ways the rise and fall of the empire of Spain was as spectacular as that of any other conquest state. In a cycle of about 400 years she passed from a purely peninsular power to the control of three-quarters of the New World, possession of colonies in the East Indies and Africa, and a dominant position in Europe, and fell again almost to the condition from which she had started. Her venture in imperialism, however, is only part of a longer story which will be given below.

From a small foothold in Asia Minor the Osmanli Turks extended their sway over the rest of that peninsula, over Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Greece, the Balkans, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, and nearly all of Hungary. Today all has been lost except Asia Minor and a small adjacent territory in Europe, but as these are occupied for the most part by a population speaking the Turkish language the state has an element of permanency entirely lacking in the empire from which it is descended. The rise and fall of this empire covered about six centuries.

We reserve to the last a discussion of the most successful of all conquest empires, Rome. From the supposed, but of course mythic, date of the founding of the city to the fall of the Eastern Empire (753 B. C. to A. D. 1453) is a stretch of about 2,200 years. The first 550 years, however, were largely devoted to the subjugation of the Italian peninsula,

and the Eastern or Byzantine Empire was Greek rather than Roman and for the last 700 years of its life it was confined to territories mainly occupied by Greeks. About 250 years were consumed in extending Roman authority over the basin of the Mediterranean outside of Italy. Of these conquests Dacia, including part of what is now Hungary, Rumania, and Transylvania, was lost 150 years after it had been acquired, Britain in about 330 years, and Gaul and Spain in about 460. Pannonia, including western Hungary and Slovenia, was held for about 440 years. Most of Thrace was lost to the Byzantine Empire about 600 years after Rome had acquired it. Egypt and Syria remained under Roman and Greek rule for 670 years, and North Africa for 700-750.

Rome presents us with optimum conditions for a permanent empire because the western part was occupied by peoples largely related in language to the Latins but of inferior culture, and the Romans were sufficiently acquainted with and sympathetic toward Greek culture to enlist the interest of their Hellenic subjects in the maintenance of the state. Those parts of the empire which were neither Latin nor Greek were relatively small, uncivilized and marginal or, like Egypt and Syria, unwarlike and highly appreciative of the commercial advantages to be derived through union with a great trading empire. But even so neither Roman nor Greek culture was able to displace the native cultures in Africa or Syria, there were two formidable rebellions in Egypt, and the Latin and Greek languages took root mainly among peoples related already in speech. Greco-Roman civilization made a vast impression on the peoples brought into contact with it and has continued to do so to our own day, yet the fact remains that the Roman Empire fell to pieces. The populations under its sway did not become imbued with an earnest desire to defend it when the crisis in its history arrived. Volumes have been written to explain the decline and fall of Rome. We merely need to remember that any state will endure, arising from its ashes even, if its citizens are inspired with a genuine desire to maintain it; the time came when the citizens of the Roman Empire did not value it enough for that.

A typical example of an area of law established by consent is supplied by Switzerland. "The Swiss Confederation," says the writer of the article on that country in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, "is made up of twenty-two small states differing from each other in nearly every point—religious, political, social, industrial, physical and linguistic; yet it forms a nation the patriotism of whose members is universally acknowledged." The nucleus out of which it grew consisted of the cantons or districts of Uri, Schwyz, and Obwalden which formed a close alliance in 1291. They

spoke a German dialect, proof that arbitrary control and submission to regimentation are not concerned in any way with German speech.

Another example of federation by consent is provided by our own country which came into existence with the union of thirteen originally distinct colonial governments along the Atlantic seaboard, colonies founded by English, Dutch, and Swedes, and many of them diverse in social background and in religious beliefs. Somewhat similar were the origins of the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia, though in the latter case without the same diversity of background.

The union of England and Scotland into the Kingdom of Great Britain by the consent of the populations of the two formerly independent states is another case in point, and so is the formation of the German Empire by the voluntary union of the south German states with Prussia in 1871.

In many cases, it is true, war has played a part in the creation of areas of law based on consent, but the contests which occurred were often between royal families, no pronounced opposition to union being present with the masses of the people, and the economic welfare of most of them being furthered by the consolidation. The small city states of Egypt and Babylonia were united in this way, but their interests were practically identical and the irrigation projects which the nature of these countries demanded were organized better by a single government than by a large number of petty states. Lattimore has shown convincingly how the proper solution of the irrigation problem in China furthered the extinction of the small feudal states and the emergence of the empire.⁶⁹ On the other hand, the conquests afterward undertaken by the rulers of these three nations, by Egypt in Syria and the upper Nile, by Babylonia in Syria, Armenia, and Asia Minor, and by China in Mongolia and Central Asia were not permanent, while the initial effort required and the subsequent control of them exhausted the resources of the dominant nation, sapped its strength, and were responsible in considerable measure for the unhealthy internal condition which later developed. In every case, too, these conquests brought about retroactive conquests—by the Hyksos, Ethiopians, Persians, and later Asiatic peoples in Egypt, by the Persians and Greeks in Babylonia, and by the Mongols and Manchus in China—though these peoples in turn were unable to effect permanent and productive unions with their conquests. Macedonia lost nearly all of hers immediately after the death of Alexander, and the Hellenistic states which sprang up in Egypt, Syria, and Bactria gradually reverted to their earlier condition.

Mention has been made of the last stage in the organization of the Second German Reich. This was preceded by a long period of expansion

on the part of the dominant state, Prussia, in which the pressure exerted from without by France probably had more effect than the demands of the German people themselves.

Napoleon's failure to create new German states as rivals of Prussia shows the futility of attempting to produce national sentiment by artificial means. Similarly, common hostility to Austria had more to do with creating modern Italy than any victories of the House of Savoy over rival Italian potentates. An artificial situation of longer growth was created by the House of Hapsburg which strove to control masses of Hungarians and Slavs by means of a Germanic minority. The empire was saved for a time by admitting the Hungarians to equal status with the Germanic population, but the first severe shock, in World War I, destroyed the entire fabric. Possibly it might have been preserved if the bold policy had been adopted of transforming the empire into a federal state and admitting the Slavs and other races to proportionate representation and local self-government within it. Years of warfare against her neighbors under the Bourbons and the Bonapartes have left France simply France except for her colonies overseas whose final status is by no means settled.

Particularly instructive in this connection is the history of the British Islands. The Anglo-Saxon states of the Heptarchy were populated by people so like one another that, in spite of numerous petty wars between them, it was possible to unite them under a single government with little difficulty and less by the conquests of the kings of Wessex than common danger from the Danes. Although this state was conquered by the Norman French, the Norman leaders ultimately had to accept the position of kings of England and give up their language for a Teutonic speech insular in origin. For 400 years they sought to maintain a large part of France under their dominion and won all the important battles with the French kings, but ultimately the will of the people in occupied France prevailed and England was obliged to surrender every foot of French territory. She succeeded in conquering the remnant of the Cymry in their last refuge in Wales but failed to crush the sense of solidarity of that brave little people, while her attempts upon the Scots ended in military disaster and union with Scotland came about by mutual consent. Although Ireland was "conquered" the Emerald Isle proved too hot, and too expensive, to hold. In the treatment of her colonies Britain has shown an exceptionally enlightened policy, yet it is questionable whether, to the mass of her people, all except those that have been repopulated have been worth the financial outlay and the governmental worry. This is said in full appreciation of all that England owes to India. As in the case of Roman intrusion into the western Mediterranean, the intro-

duction of a higher civilization may have brought some compensation to the people conquered. On the other hand, it is by no means certain that better results might not have been attained by less violent means and that the position of dominance is healthy for the conquerors. It is difficult to continue equitable treatment of all classes in one part of an empire if a discordant situation is created in any other part of it. In any case, President Wilson was absolutely right in regarding the colonial status as temporary.

In Scandinavia we have an example of three nations entertaining strong feelings of friendship for one another but jealous of their respective liberties. By the Union of Kalmar (1397-1523) the Danish monarchs sought to erect a superstate out of the three, dominated by themselves, but in a very short time this was disrupted by the revolt of the Swedes, and ultimately the Norwegians realized their own aspirations for liberty by a triumph for reason and common sense in the peaceful relinquishment of Norway by Sweden which had in the meantime acquired it from Denmark.

Russia was unified by wars between several smaller states of like language and culture, and common hatred of the Mongols. The process seems to have met little opposition from the masses of the people, but when extended to peoples of different culture and traditions, particularly the Poles and Finns, constant friction has been the result. Friction was also certain to come about between the Russian people and the Siberian races conquered by them, but many of these are small and uncivilized and the enlightened policy of the present U.S.S.R. Government in this respect, not to mention extensive Russian colonization, is likely to extinguish in time, if it has not already done so, the feeling of a conqueror-conquered relation.

A curious situation is presented by the Iberian Peninsula. This region was first made into a unit under the Roman Empire, though Rome's conquest of the northwest seems not to have been very complete. The Visigoths who succeeded the Romans were a small minority in the midst of an ill-integrated mixture of races and never succeeded in a thorough unification of the country. Such work as they attempted, indeed, was destroyed in the Moslem invasion and for a time it looked as if a Mohammedan Spain would be the outcome similar to the result of Arab conquest in Egypt, North Africa, Syria, and Mesopotamia. Nevertheless, Mohammedan Spain was almost immediately separated from other Mohammedan lands, and the territory of the peninsula was soon divided between Moslem states in the south and Christian states in the mountains of the north. Near the end of the fifteenth century the last

Mohammedan kingdom was destroyed, and all the Christian states except Portugal were united under Ferdinand and Isabella. Although the monarchs of Castile and Aragon tried to destroy separatist elements by expelling the Moors from Spain, the divided and chaotic condition of the country for so many centuries has left its mark upon the peninsula. Portugal was brought under the Spanish crown for about 60 years, but she presently reasserted and maintained her independence, and at the other side of the peninsula progressive Catalonia has retained strong separatist tendencies, while the Basques in the north regard themselves as an essentially distinct people. Immediately after the conquest of the last Moorish kingdom Spain launched out upon a career of conquest which should have brought her unexampled prosperity if an empire attained by conquest can produce it. Her sovereigns could never, however, grasp the fact that the only way to build up a permanent state is to enlist the interest and devotion of all the populations belonging to it. Instead of doing so, they attempted to rule by force and to exploit their several conquests for the sole benefit of Spain. As a result, Spain brought upon herself the expensive and disastrous revolt of the Netherlands, and later on the total loss of her American possessions, while her Italian wars left her with nothing to show for them but immense sacrifices of men and money, and disease and poverty at home.

Observing how readily public sentiment seems to be swayed by plausible popular leaders and how frequently the masses have been excited into war in the most unjust causes, not a few writers have become contemptuous of popular opinion. Yet every politician knows that his constituents entertain certain sentiments that he seldom dares oppose. Upon this popular sentiment nations rest. They may be brought together or split permanently only in conformity with it. Popular sentiment changes, but it cannot be accelerated much by artificial means, it cannot be coerced, and it meets attempts at coercion with a quiet sabotage impossible to control. The historical record teaches that conquests not in conformity with the will of the conquered are never permanent except in the case of a few backward peoples when conquest is followed by colonization and the partial or complete extinction of the conquered. Otherwise even the extension of a higher civilization over a lower one seldom produces a permanent empire but merely, as in the case of the western Mediterranean under Roman rule, postpones the date of its fall.

The failure of most conquest empires may be foretold as a mathematical certainty. As the empire spreads, its circumference of course lengthens, and with every extension it is brought into contact with more peoples, and proportionately more difficulties arise. The military tradi-

tion having been established in the conquering nation, military rather than peaceful means are generally resorted to in order to settle these difficulties, and if, as is normally the case, the peoples already conquered remain unreconciled to their subordinate position, the empire is faced with both external wars and internal revolts, all of which make ever increasing drafts on the resources and the man power of the conquerors. The younger generations of the nuclear power are meanwhile apt to be diverted from a military life in order to enjoy the spoils of the conquered and in the spread of luxuries among them become progressively softened. There is an increasing temptation, therefore, to employ professional soldiers of whatever nation and in time these foreign mercenaries may come to outnumber the native levies and can be kept in line only so long as it may be made pecuniarily to their advantage. But a nation divorced from productive industry and forced to live on spoils can hold its mercenaries in line only so long as it can point the way to spoils. This becomes increasingly difficult with the extension of the empire, and as it declines the support of the mercenaries will decline with it. As they have no other interest in the empire which employs them, they may presently turn to plundering that empire itself in the supposed interest of a rebellious general, and quite as readily in the interest of a foreign potentate. Finally the time will come when the ability of the original conquerors to maintain themselves is gone and the will of those chosen to do it for them has come to an end. The collapse of the empire is then "just around the corner." Not all of these causes have operated in the case of every conquest empire nor do they exhaust the causes of their fall, but they supply the reasons why many have fallen from the very height of their apparent prosperity. In other cases the downfall took place in stages but was rapid none the less.

From time to time a conquest empire has attempted to perpetuate itself by metamorphosing its manhood into a permanent army in which everything is sacrificed to preparation for war and the conduct of it, family life and individual happiness being cast aside for the assumed greater good of the state, a state living, however, not by its own productive powers but by appropriating the goods of others. The African Jagas are an excellent instance of a military state of this kind, but the classic example is the Greek city-state of Sparta. As might have been anticipated from their very nature as appropriators rather than producers, such states have added comparatively little to the world's riches or the world's culture and have seldom survived their first serious defeat. It is an interesting commentary on the relative effects of regimentation and intellectual freedom plus survival through competition that Sparta won her

great victory over Athens at Syracuse largely through the advice of the Athenian Alcibiades. Once master of all Greece, however, she knew not what to do with her victory, and when her stereotyped method of fighting proved no match for the genius of Epaminondas and she suffered a crushing defeat at Leuctra, she never recovered from the blow.

WAR AND TRADE

War and trade are basically hostile because trade and its handmaid manufacture flourish only as exchange is unhampered, prosperity equally spread, and the level of culture and the healthy demands of the individual at a maximum. War on the other hand—I speak primarily of offensive war without which war would not exist—interrupts free communication between nations, destroys manufacturing plants and means of transportation, kills initiative by appropriating the fruits of industry without compensation, seeks to benefit one group to the disadvantage of another or of others, cuts down the cultural level and reduces the power, and ultimately the desire, of consumers to purchase and enjoy. We are, of course, familiar with the slogan that "trade follows the flag," and commercial interests have too often been induced to welcome an alliance with the military in order to push the sales of home industries, collect debts from recalcitrant, backward peoples, and drive out rival tradesmen belonging to other nations. A certain amount of trade may, indeed, follow the flag under such conditions, but if by reducing the sales of rivals it reduces the ability of their nationals to purchase, the indirect loss may more than offset the actual gain. And that is not all. Resort of one group of traders to military help is certain to inspire rival groups to do the same, and such rivalry will be reflected in increased armaments and in increased military appropriations, much of which the shortsighted tradesmen will have to pay. As the rivalry continues, the military will perforce take an ever-increasing slice of profits from trade and manufacture and indirectly from the population as a whole. The end result will almost certainly be war with its immediate consequences in the destruction of factories and established habits of exchange and ultimate complete bankruptcy of one or both parties to the conflict.

If we review the entire course of history we shall see that in the long run war has been the deadly enemy of trade and manufacture (or rather, more broadly, of production), that the latter have been the world's great benefactors on the purely material plane, and war their principal handicap. An illusion to the contrary has been created because many of the great conquest empires have brought into existence areas of relative peace in which trade could function with less disturbance than before.

This is perhaps illustrated most significantly in the case of the Roman Empire, when the Pax Romana introduced a security which caused numbers of unhealthy walled towns to be abandoned and trade flourished, the area of trade being largely secured by the power of the Roman army. Such examples show the fortunate condition to be anticipated if instead of being local and detached, such areas could have been, or could be, run together, peace being then universal. Until that happens armies in such areas perform an important function which must not be overlooked, and I shall speak of that more at length a little later. In conquest empires like Rome they did create areas of peaceful trade and relative prosperity. The utility of a conquest empire must be judged, however, not by a small segment of time but by its total effect from the beginning of its career until the end. Now, in the course of its building, a conquest empire destroys the trade, traders, commercial establishments, and prosperity of the nations conquered. If we consider its population as a whole, the question remains whether prosperity acquired by its traders in the wake of its victorious armies is equivalent to the sum total of prosperity of conquerors and conquered alike before the violent annexation took place, or whether the traders of the victorious nation are as prosperous as if their business had been extended in peaceful ways. The second question is whether the mounting costs of the military will not tax commercial classes in the conquering nation sufficiently to wipe out their additional profits. At first this may not be the case, but, as I have pointed out, the demands of the military in a conquest empire will probably increase steadily, more and more opposition will be encountered without and, as productive industry declines, more and more disturbances arise within. A few major wars will probably wipe out any and all initial gains. When the end of the empire comes such traders and manufacturers as remain will be subjected to the same kind of expropriation that they formerly applauded when their own country was the aggressor, and they will be faced with utter ruin.

CONSTRUCTIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY

The constructive functions of armies and navies are in maintenance of areas of peace and in defense of such areas when they are threatened from without. Just as the local prosperity within an area of peace proves the value of peace, so the function of military forces in maintaining that area is an indication of their value when they act in the capacity of police. The defect of a conquest empire does not lie in its size or in its forces when acting to maintain order, but in the measures by which it was brought into existence and in the fact that it is administered for the

benefit of one portion of the population as against the rest, either the original conquering nation as a whole or a political, commercial, or military class. Favoritism of this kind is inherent in the very origin of the conquest empire, and although it may shift with a shift in power, it is never lived down because the tradition of arbitrary force is incorporated into its very mores from the beginning.

As long as armies and navies are used for aggressive ends, however, even the most peacefully inclined state must have armies and navies to preserve its integrity. Failure to recognize clearly the difference between the protective function and the aggressive perversion of the military has occasioned a great deal of false reasoning, and this is not surprising because wars sometimes break out in such ways that it is difficult to determine which nation is the aggressor and which the nation attacked, while in the course of any contest defense often calls for attack and attack when unsuccessful will degenerate into defense. Nevertheless, it should never be forgotten that there is a radical distinction between the activities of armed forces in these two capacities, and the moral judgments ultimately passed upon nations will make this question one of primary importance. As attacker a nation places itself in the criminal category, and its forces are then its agents in the commission of theft, murder, and destruction of values. In defense, however, it represents law and order, and its armies and navies, whether successful or not, are attempting to perform the functions of a police force in upholding law and order. The fact that the terms "military forces" and "police" are used when speaking of international and intranational affairs respectively does not alter the reality of the situation.

WORLD UNITY THROUGH A CONQUEST EMPIRE

Because of the theoretical advantages that might be enjoyed under a single world-wide government, and because of the quick results that seem to be attained by military means, the grandiose idea has from time to time possessed the minds of certain able and unscrupulous leaders to unite the nations in this way. With our present increasingly rapid means of communication and transportation, particularly the development of the airplane and the radio, this has seemed increasingly possible. Nevertheless, an empire built up by such means would not last even if a large part of the world's industrial plant were brought under control. It would be impossible to insure the continuance in power of men of the talent and intentions of the original conqueror, nor would it be possible to get the masses of the conquering nation to dedicate themselves indefi-

nitely to the duty of keeping the rest of the world in subjection. The Romans, most successful of empire builders, found it necessary to admit progressively to citizenship the peoples they had conquered, with the result that Rome and Italy itself gradually lost control of the state. Sooner or later the control of a master race in our hypothetical empire would slip and a revolt or succession of revolts would tear it to pieces, unless, indeed, it were entirely made over. Only unions between states having behind them the sentiments of the populations composing them may be counted upon to have any lasting quality.

WARFARE NOT INEVITABLE

War is frequently called an inevitable, even if undesirable, human institution, so much a part of human nature that any attempt to end it is useless. Such a characterization is, however, misleading. It is indeed true that envy, hatred, combativeness, acquisitiveness, and the disturbances arising from them are widespread manifestations of human nature, and though we may hope to reduce the extent of the calamities they bring in their train, their extinction would appear hopeless. War, however, although arising from such moral defects—and from attempts to control them—is an institution which has not always existed, is not equally developed in all parts of the world, is variously motivated, and is only one manifestation of the human tendencies above mentioned. Other manifestations are riots, duels, street brawls, gangsterism, murder, theft, etc.

In other words war is an expression of man's antisocial tendencies, and just as individual and collective crime have to be controlled within the state by men trained and equipped to meet them, in other words the police, so the destructive threat represented by foreign armed forces when used for aggression must be countered by armed forces prepared to meet them. An army is no more desirable than a police force or a fire department but just as necessary. Crimes and fires are undesirable but must be guarded against, and so under present conditions must attacks by aggressor nations. However, with the advance of civilization and the expansion of the nations of the earth more and more territory has been taken from the protection of armies and placed under that of police. It is no longer necessary for England and Scotland, Prussia and Bavaria, Castile and Aragon to maintain armies against each other. Between many of the nations that remain there is a constantly increasing tendency to settle differences by peaceful means, war between the United States and Canada, or between the Scandinavian states, for instance, being practi-

cally unthinkable. About 70 areas of law exist at the present time, but these represent still larger territories within which war is unlikely to take place. It is evident that if these "areas of law" and areas of good feeling continue to spread, the preservation of order will pass over more and more to the police, or to armed forces acting in that capacity, and when that tendency has worked through to its natural consummation, the reign of law will be complete and armies and navies assume merely police functions.

It is supposed by some that warfare is kept alive by a kind of inherent human pugnacity, but our consideration of the origins of war and attitudes toward it among different peoples (pp. 3-7, 8-9) should make it evident that collective pugnacity is an acquired trait—cultural, not biological. In truth, the *masses* of mankind today are induced to fight from a feeling of insecurity. Fear and not hatred is the underlying, if not the dominant, motive, and if this fear can be allayed the so-called "belligerency" will disappear with it. If, without any further world organization, the nations of the earth could agree to settle their difficulties in peaceful ways and cooperate to enforce such settlements on all nations which persist in resorting to violence, and if they gave sufficient evidence of their genuine determination to do so, the master nerve of war would be severed.

In spite of the cataclysmic outbreak of violence which we are witnessing at the present time, it is evident that the tendencies above outlined are working slowly forward, though it would be hazardous to predict the future course of events or set any definite term to the institution of war. The end is apparent; the time of the end is not. Yet there is no mystery about the force required to terminate warfare. All that is needed is the will to do so.

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